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COMMENTS
The Doctrine of Worthier Title
in Arkansas
There is no body of law more arcane-or more fascinating to a
peculiar mind-than the law of future interests. It is a common-
place that its origins are inextricably rooted in the political his-
tory of medieval England.' For that reason future interests law
is perhaps often regarded as an unfathomable collection of anach-
ronous absurdities, having little or no relevance to contemporary
law practice. But its precepts and principles have much modern
significance; it has survived as more than a source of cerebral
exercise for academic necrophiliacs. Consider for example the
impact which the Rule in Shelley's Case may have upon the per-
sonal fortunes of litigants;2 the importance of future interests law
in determining the incidence and extent of death taxes; 3 and the
effect of the Rule against Perpetuities upon future generations.
4
Other examples come readily to mind, but suffice it to say that an
appreciation of the law of future interests is often necessary in
understanding the broad legal implications of many fact situa-
tions.
This comment deals with one of the rules of future interests
law-the doctrine of worthier title. The rule exists in two related
but considerably divergent forms: the wills branch and the inter
vivos branch. It seems likely that these two branches originated
from the same feudal policies, 5 thus they bear the same name.
6
1 Edward B. Meriwether, Emeritus Professor of Law, University of
Arkansas, was reportedly fond of saying that "the law of property is
historical in its origins, not logical." Leflar, Legal Education in Arkansas,
16 ARK. L. REV. 191, 202 (1962). Compare Mr. Justice Holmes's classic
comment in New York Trust v. Gisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921): "Upon
this subject, a page of history is worth a volume of logic."
2 For a concise but encompassing review of the Arkansas cases in-
volving the Rule in Shelley's Case, see Fetters, The Entailed Estate: Fer-
ment for Reform in Arkansas, 19 ARK. L. REV. 275, 280 (1966).
3 In Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 118 (1940) the Court rejected
"the elusive and subtle casuistries" of state future interests law in deter-
mining certain federal estate tax questions. State law, however, still exerts
a great influence in tax matters. See LOwNDES & KRAMER, FEDERAL Es-
TATE AND GIFT TAXES 52-55 (2d ed. 1962); Cardozo, Federal Taxes and the
Radiating Potencies of State Court Decisions, 51 YALE L.J. 783 (1943).
4 In discussing the Rule against Perpetuities, professor Leach prophe-
sies: "[T]he counsellor who leaves behind him a will book which succeeds
in placing property where his clients wished it without those uncertainties
as to validity and ambiguities as to meaning which breed litigation, can
sleep the eternal sleep in the comforting knowledge that he has upheld
the finest traditions of his craft." Leach, Perpetuities in A Nutshell, 51
HARV. L. REV. 638, 671 (1938).
5 See SIMES & SMITH, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1607 (2d ed.
1956).
6 One commentator has suggested that the name "doctrine of worthier
title" is a misnomer when applied to the inter vivos branch of the rule.
As will be demonstrated, however, their scope and operation are
quite different; it is therefore convenient to dichotomize the dis-
cussion.
I. THE WILLs BRANCH OF THE DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE
An extended discussion of the various aspects of the wills
branch is beyond the scope of this comment.' However, it is felt
that an elementary examination of the rule, and an analysis of the
few Arkansas cases which are relevant, will serve a useful purpose. s
The clearest articulation of the rule which has been discovered
is as follows:
"A devise of a present or future interest in land to the heir of the
testator, either by name or in form, is void if the heir takes by
virtue of the devise preccisely the same interest he would have
taken if the devise had been stricken out of the will."9
Thus, by application of the rule, an heir-devisee may take his title
by descent rather than under the will. 10
A. Origins of the Wills Branch
The exact origin of this rule is obscured by centuries of case
law and commentary." Like most rules of property, it apparently
did not emerge full-born in any one case; 12 its development oc-
curred incrementally. But why should a person who is plainly
designated as a devisee take by descent rather than by the will?
For an answer, we must look to the historical background from
which the rule sprang.
Several explanations have been advanced. 13 By far the most
plausible regards the doctrine as a product of the economic system
of feudal tenure, and its attendant duties and obligations. For
instance, if a tenant died leaving minor heirs, the lord, as one of the
See Warren, A Remainder to the Grantor's Heirs, 22 TEX. L. REV. 22 (1943).
This denomination, however, persists in the literature, and will be used here.
7 The most exhaustive analysis of the wills branch may be found in
Morris, The Wills Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 54 MICH. L. REV.
451 (1956).
8 Consider the following statement: "That in modern litigation ...
both the bench and bar frequently overlook the rule preferring descent
to purchase [the wills branch] cannot be doubted." Note, 46 HARV. L.
REV. 993, 1000 (1933).
9 Morris, supra note 8, at 134.
10 "When the same estate is devised to a man which he would have
taken by descent, he shall be in by descent ... " Clarke v. Smith, 1
Comyrs 63, 92 Eng. Rep. 965 (K.B. 1700).
" The development of the rule is carefully delineated in Harper and
Heckel, The Doctrine of Worthier Title, 24 ILL. L. REV. 627, 628 et seq.
(1930).12 The Rule in Shelley's Case is a good example. The fact is that
the only thing known with certainty about its origin is that it did not
originate in Shelley's case. See SIMES & SMITH, supra note 5, at § 1542.
13 For a review and evaluation of these explanations, see Harper &
Heckel, supra note 11, at 627.
perquisites of his position, was entitled to the rights of wardship
and marriage. 14 These benefits did not enure to the lord if the
heir took by purchase instead of descent. 15 Thus, even though
the statute of wills'" permitted testamentary transmission of
property generally, the dubious fiction that it was worthier to
take by descent than by will was invented to assure to the lord
his feudal tax should the ancestor devise his property to his own
right heirs. 1 7
B. Present-day Legal Significance of the Wills Branch
Before proceeding to determine whether the wills branch is
part of Arkansas law, it seems pertinent to inquire whether today
the rule is of any legal significance. For if it has no significance,
its existence would be of only passing interest. Since the rule
applies only when the interest devised is exactly the same as that
which the devisee would take through intestacy, the rule could
hardly operate to diminish or enlarge that person's share. Con-
sequently, at first blush, the wills branch seems quite inconse-
quential, merely an interesting legal oddity. In fact, the Restate-
ment maintains that "the rule .. .has completely lost significance
in the solution of modern problems."'" This particular Restate-
ment may well be an overstatement;' 9 there are several situations
in which the outcome of litigation has turned on the acceptance 20
or rejection 21 of the rule. Accordingly, a brief review of these
situations follows.
1. The Course of Descent
The common-law system of descents had, as its primary object,
the restriction of inheritance to blood linesY2  The fifth of Black-
14 See 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 242. These feudalistic rights
were abolished by statute in 1660. 12 Car. II, c. 24 (1660).
15 "The prosperity of the great lords, and thus indirectly the pros-
perity of the King, depended upon a continuous flow of these monetary
prerequisites (reliefs, wardships and marriages) which accrued upon a
descent and which were a forerunner of our modern inheritance taxes;
hence the common-law prohibition of devises, the doctrine of worthier title,
and the Rule in Shelley's Case, all designed to foster the passages of real
estate by descent." LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON WILLS 1 (2d ed. Rev. 1960).
16 32 Hen. VIII C. 1 (1540).
17 See 1 Ves. Jun. Supp. 2, 34 Eng. Rep. 666, Supplementing Ellis v.
Smith, 1 Ves. Jun. 11, 30 Eng. Rep. 205 (Ch. 1754), where this statement
of the rule is offered: "When a devise of lands to the heir at law makes
no alteration in the nature or limitation of the estate, the heir will take, not
by purchase under the will, but by his preferable title by descent." (em-
phasis added).
18 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 314 (2) comment j at 1787 (1940).
19 See Morris, supra note 7, at 483 et. seq. The RESTATEMENT also takes
the position that there is no such rule. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 314
(2) (1940).
20 The rule has been accepted or referred to in a large number of states.
See Harper & Heckel, supra note 11, at 642. See also Morris, supra note
7, at 486, where these jurisdictions and the cases therein are enumerated.
21 The courts of at least two states have refused to accept the rule
as law. Mitchell v. Dauphin Trust Co., 283 Ky. 532, 142 S.W.2d 181 (1940);
Lucas v. Parsons, 24 Ga. 640 (1857).
22 See generally Comment, 42 YALE L.J. 101 (1932).
stone's famous canons of descent provided that in order for col-
laterals to inherit, they must be of the blood of the "first purchaser"
in the family line.23 In practice, this rule meant that if an intes-
tate's property came to him by descent, the stock of descent was
the first person discovered, in tracing the family line, who had
taken the land by purchase. The rule is thus perhaps more ac-
curately termed the "last purchaser" rule.24  Thus if a land-
owner 25 died intestate without lineal descendants, and he had ac-
quired his land by descent, collaterals had to show blood relation-
ship not only to the intestate, but to the last purchasing an-
cestor..2 6 It was therefore "vitally important in tracing the course
of descent of land to ascertain whether it was acquired by
descent or purchase.
'27
The difficulty is best illustrated by an example. Suppose A
acquires land from a stranger to his blood and dies intestate leav-
ing his son B as his only heir. B dies intestate survived by his
son C as heir. C dies intestate with no lineal descendants. Who
may take? At common law, it is clear that only those collateral
heirs of C who were of the blood of A could be called to the in-
heritance. 28
The ancestral property doctrine which today exists, in various
forms, in many states is often compared to the common-law scheme
of descents.29 It is clear, for instance, that they have in common
the object of keeping land in the family. In the United States,
relaxation of the rigid family connection requirement was almost
universally deemed desirable. Today only three states (Arkansas,
Delaware, and Tennessee) adhere to the ancestral property doctrine
to the extent that collaterals of the whole blood (but not of the
blood of the "transmitting ancestor") are excluded from inheri-
tance.30 The ancestral estate statutes usually define ancestral
property as land which had been acquired by descent, devise, or
gift from an ancestor 1
A question has developed, in construing ancestral estate stat-
.utes, as to whether the old common-law "first purchaser" rule has
survived. Because the ancestral estate statutes include within their
purview some land which has been acquired by purchase (i.e. gift
or devise) as well as that which has been acquired by descent, there
is some justification for regarding the doctrine of "first purchaser"
as repudiated.8 2  In fact, virtually all of the authority supports
23 2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *220.
24 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY § 1115 (3d ed. 1939).
25 The rule had no application to personalty.
26 See Note, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 625 (1912).
27 Morris, supra note 7, at 470.
28 There could be collateral heirs of C who were not of A's blood; e.g.,
siblings of C's mother, B's wife. See Meek, Descent and Distribution,
ARKANSAS DESK MANUAL § 20, n.7 (1961).
29 For such a comparison, see 6 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY, § 1001 (1965).
30 See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-110 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. T. 12 § 501
(1953); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-101 (1955).
31 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-123 (1947).
32 In 46 HAav. L. REV. 993 at page 997 the commentator, in reviewing
the principle that it is only necessary to be of the blood of the
intestate's immediate ancestor in order to inherit.33 These decisions
are based on an interpretation of statutes adhering to the gift-de-
vise-descent trichotomy. Although these cases seem sound, the
"first purchaser" doctrine might still have some vitality. In Ar-
kansas, statutory provision has been made for land to "descend
according to the course of the common law" 34 in cases of in-
testate devolution not otherwise provided for in the general statutes
of descent. If therefore the Arkansas statutes are incompatible
with the first purchaser rule, it is because of a conflict in policy
and not a case of mutually exclusive propositions 5
the significance of the wills branch, states that so far as problems of
descent are concerned, "the problem has ceased to exist, since even in the
few states which retain the doctrine of ancestral estates, statutes uniformly
include realty coming to the intestate by devise or gift as well as by de-
scent." The statement is perhaps in error in three particulars. The prin-
cipal error is in assuming that the doctrine of first purchaser is necessarily
abrogated by the change in the statutory scheme. Moreover, at the time
the note was written, the state of North Carolina had a statute which did
not come within the category above presumed. N.C. CODE § 1754(4) (1939).
The statute has, however, been repealed and no distinction is now made
between ancestral and newly-acquired property. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-3(Repl. 1966). In some states, the property of a minor descends in a
prescribed manner if it was acquired by "inheritance." Presumably, if it
was acquired by will, then the course of descent would be different. See
Gordon v. Gregg, 164 Ore. 306, 97 P.2d, aff'd on rehearing, 101 P.2d 414(1940). Arkansas has no such statute.
33 The first case so decided was apparently Gardner v. Collins, 27 U.S.
(2 Pet.) 58 (1829).
84 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-113 (1947). In West v. Williams, 15 Ark.
682, 692 (1855) the following statement appears:
[I]t is the manifest intention of the legislature, upon the death of
the intestate, without issue, to preserve them [estates coming by
devise or gift from a relative] in the line of the blood from whence
they came, to the same extent that descended estates were so pre-
served at common law [emphasis added]. To carry out that inten-
tion ... analogous means must be used. [Hence it was an inevi-
table principle that] to be of the blood of the last purchasing
ancestor, in the line of the transmitting relative, is as indispensable
to enable a collateral to inherit, as heir of the intestate, an ancestral
estate which was given or devised to the intestate, as to be of the
blood of the last purchasing ancestor was, according to the princi-
ples of the common law, to enable him to inherit, as heir of the
intestate, an ancestral estate which had come to the intestate by
descent.
Thus the court rejected the contention that the change from the common-
law sysem of descent abrogated the first purchaser principle.
35 The Arkansas Supreme Court has not been favorably impressed
with the vestiges of common law adhered to in the statutes of descent. It
has commented on "the impolicy of establishing lines of blood at all, in a
new country, where almost every man is the architect of his own fortune
and the stock of descent." Kelly's Heirs v. McGuire, 15 Ark. 555, 589 (1855).
The court has been generally critical of these statutes. It remarked that
portions of them were borrowed from New York, but they also contain
"additions- not calculated to improve, and . . . attempts at brevity and
perspecuity neither happy nor successful." Id. at 583. One case referred
to the statutes as "our confused and incongruous law of descents and dis-
tributions." Oliver v. Vance, 34 Ark. 564, 567 (1879). An Arkansas at-
torney has noted that the statutes have "obfuscated Arkansas lawyers for
more than one hundred years." Meek, Descent and Distribution, AR-
KANSAS DESK MANuAL 17 (1961).
The doctrine of worthier title plays its part in this confusion
as follows. Using the example above, suppose B had devised his
interest to C instead of dying intestate. The doctrine of worthier
title aside, C would be a purchaser and would become a stock of
descent. But since C would have taken the land by descent as
B's heir without the devise, the wills branch declares the devise
void. Thus the devise did not break the chain of descent, and
collaterals must still show themselves to be of A's blood to inherit.
As stated previously, most states have rejected the idea of
"first purchaser" entirely, and it has thus been unnecessary in
those states to inquire whether such a devise breaks the course of
descent.3 6 Until quite recently, however the status of the first
purchaser rule in Arkansas was uncertain.37 Not only were the
Arkansas cases conflicting, but individual cases contradicted their
expressed decisional rationale. 38 Cupp v. Frazier's Heirs3" dis-
pelled the uncertainty by unequivocally accepting the first pur-
chaser rule as part of Arkansas law. The legal implications of the
doctrine of worthier title thus become immediately apparent.
The doctrine may operate to transform a purchaser into an heir,
and impose upon collaterals, in the event of future intestate devolu-
tion, additional blood requirements. 40
36 "d 'Ancestor' means the immediate and not the remote ancestor."
Simes, Ancestral and Non-Ancestral Realty under the Ohio Statutes of
Descent, 2 U. CiNN. L. REV. 387, 396 (1928), citing Curreu v. Taylor, 19
Ohio 36 (1850). "The ancestor from whom descent must be traced is, with
the exception of North Carolina, the one from whom the property imme-
diately came to the intestate, rather than the original purchaser." Comment,
42 YALE L.J. 101, 103 (1932). The North Carolina case referred to is Poisson
v. Pettaway, 159 N.C. 650, 75 S.E. 930 (1912). As noted before, the case
is no longer authority in that jurisdiction since the ancestral estate doc-
trine has been abandoned. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-1 (Repl. 1966). See
generally ATKINSON, WILLS 61 (1937).
37 Thus one writer noted: "This rule of 'first purchaser' has affected
the Arkansas law to an uncertain extent." Meek, Descent and Distribu-
tion, ARKANSAS DESK MANUAL 11 (1961). Mr. Meek also commented that
it would be "difficult for an attorney, in the present state of the decisions,
.to give an affirmative opinion" as to the state of Arkansas law on the
subject. Id. at 27. The dictum from West v. Williams quoted in note 34
supra is of course an acceptance of the doctrine. But see Carter v. Carter,
129 Ark. 7, 195 S.W. 10, aff'd on rehearing, 129 Ark. 573, 195 S.W. 1184(1917). One writer accepts this case as a rejection of the first purchaser
rule. See ROLLISON, WILLS 47 (1939).
38 See Carter v. Carter, 129 Ark. 7, 195 S.W. 10 (1917). This case
overruled Johnson v. Phillips, 85 Ark. 86, 107 S.W. 170 (1908), a case which
applied the first purchaser rule. However, in deciding Carter, the court
alluded with apparent approval to the dictum in West which accepted the
doctrine; the decision was therefore of limited value.
39 239 Ark. 77, 387 S.W.2d 328 (1965). The court said the opinion
would not be applied retroactively, but only "with respect to estates that
may vest in the future." Id. at 82, 387 S.W.2d at 331. One question which
this statement raises is the status of the rule as it may be applied to the
successive devolution of contingent interests. Contingent interests are of
course often descendible, but the court here talks only in terms of vested
estates. As to the transmissibility of contingent interests, see Note, 20
ARK. L. REV. 190 (1966).
40 Admittedly, the result suggested is somewhat anomalous. It seems
that the legislature intended to place land acquired by descent, devise, or
gift from a relative on a completely even footing, and that therefore a
2. Other Possible Legal Consequences in Arkansas
The Iowa lapse statute,41 in combination with the wills branch,
has produced some interesting 2 case law. The argument in-
volved is simple but ingenious. Suppose A devises property to
B and B turns out to be A's heir. Suppose further that B pre-
deceases A. The Iowa statute provides that "if a devisee dies
before the testator, his heirs shall inherit" the property devised.
43
Since this devise is void ab initio, by application of the wills
branch, B was never a devisee; the "devisee's" heirs cannot there-
fore inherit.44 They may stand in no better position under the
will than can the "devisee."
The scope of the Arkansas lapse statute45 differs somewhat
from Iowa's, but the wills branch could have a similar effect in
this type of case. The Arkansas lapse statute provides, in part,
that if a devisee should die before the testator, and if he is a "child
• . . or other descendant" of the testator, then the devise does not
lapse but "shall vest in the surviving child or other descendant of
the devisee. '46 The thrust of this section is identical to Iowa's,
with its scope limited to those instances where the devisee is a
child or other descendant of the testator. Therefore, the argument
made in Iowa might prevail in Arkansas.
But the logic of that argument has persuaded no one but the
Iowa Supreme Court. Commentators have uniformly denounced
these cases. 47 As the Restatement points out, the argument in-
volves "a fallacy . . . easily illustrated. '48  Its most obvious weak-
ness is in its strained and literal interpretation of the lapse statute.
The purpose of the statute is to abrogate the common-law rule
that a devise lapses if the devisee predeceases the testator. Mani-
festly, to allow the worthier title doctrine to carve out and except
from the statute's operation those situations in which the devisee is
also an heir amounts to a decimation of legislative intent. The
typical lapse statute is "pre-eminently concerned with the type of
case which involves a devise to the testator's heirs; '49 Arkansas's
statute is solely concerned with that type of case.
"purchase" from an ancestor should not be allowed to break the course of
descent. This would of course be an extension of the common law and
would transform the first purchaser rule into a "first family holder rule."
See text accompanying note 61 infra.
41 IOWA CODE § 6663.16 (1954).
42 Other adjectives have been employed to describe the Iowa cases.
"Curious." Morris, supra note 7, at 431; "Peculiar." Harper & Heckel, supra
note 11, at 651. "Curious." MECHEM, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FuTuRE
INTERESTS 52 (1958).
43 IOWA CODE § 6663.16 (1959).
44 See In re Warren's Estate, 211 Iowa 940, 234 N.W. 835 (1931), noted
in 16 IOWA L. REV. 559 (1931); Beem v. Beem, 241 Iowa 107, 41 N.W. 247
(1950).
45 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-410 (Supp. 1966).
46 Id.
47 See, e.g., Note, 39 IOWA L. REV. 199 (1953).
48 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 314, comment i at 1788 (1940).
49 Id.
The other portion of the Arkansas lapse statute also is of in-
terest. It provides that if "a devise of property .. . is void .. .
the property shall become a part of the residue. ... 5o If taken
literally, in conjunction with the doctrine of worthier title, this sec-
tion could cause fantastic distortions of testamentary intent. The
wills branch declares certain devises void. This statute applies,
presumably, in all cases where the devise is void. Therefore,
residuary heirs would take the property devised to heirs.
This argument is of course completely specious. The doctrine
of worthier title declares devises "void" only in the sense that the
will is not the vehicle of transmission; the law is presumed to
transmit the property by intestate devolution. The doctrine is
therefore predicated upon the fact that the person will be in by
descent. Since this statute voids that predicate, the doctrine should
not be applied. But the argument advanced here is only slightly
more preposterous than the one made in Iowa. There is therefore
a possibility that a party urging this result might prevail in a
hyper-technical court. Hopefully, the Arkansas courts would not
be so persuaded.
There is one more situation in which the wills branch might
have significance in Arkansas. The Arkansas abatement statutes
provide that if property of a decedent must be sold to satisfy
claims or legacies, the intestate assets are to be sold before
property devised."1 Normally, this testate-intestate bifurcation
occurs only when there is no residuary clause in the will.5 2 How-
ever, if the doctrine causes an heir-devisee to take by descent, it
is possible that his property would be sold to satisfy debts before
the property of other devisees. At least two cases have so held;58
no American case has been discovered which rejects the argu-
ment.54
There are many other situations in which the doctrine of
worthier title has been influential in the outcome of litigation.55
Commentators have hypothetically posed still others.56 For our
purposes, it seems clearly demonstrated that the doctrine, if it
exists in Arkansas, would be of legal significance. It is therefore
pertinent now to inquire as to the status of the doctrine in Ar-
kansas.
50 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 60-410 (Supp. 1965).
51 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 62-2903 (Supp. 1965). The statute is discussed
in 12 ARK. L. REv. 38, 43 (1957).
52 Am. STAT. ANN. § 60-411 (Supp. 1965) provides that in the event of
partial intestacy, "the part not disposed of by will shall be distributed as
provided by law with respect to the estates of intestates."
53 See Mitchell v. Mitchell, 21 Md. 244 (1864); Ellis v. Page, 61 Mass.161 (1855).654 An English case rejected the argument. Biederman v. Seymour, 3
Beav. 368, 49 Eng. Rep. 144 (1840).
55 See generally Morris, supra note 7. See also Note, 16 TEN. L. REV.
358 (1940).
56 See, e.g., Note, 14 N. C. L. Rv. 90, 95 (1935).
C. The Arkansas Cases
There seems to be only one Arkansas case which discusses the
wills branch at any length. In West v. Williams,57 the court re-
viewed a chancery action for the recovery of a tract of land. A,
having received the property by devise from his maternal grand-
mother, died intestate leaving no issue. B, A's father, claimed the
land ascended to him; the grandmother's relatives maintained that
they were the rightful heirs. Counsel for B argued that A
did not take, under his grandmother's will, as devisee, but inherited
the land as her sole heir at law. For, where land is devised to
the heir at law in the same estate, which he would take as heir,
the devise is inoperative, and the heir takes by descent as the
better title.58
Just exactly what benefit would devolve upon B from the opera-
tion of the wills branch is not readily perceived. If anything, the
other party to the suit should have been urging the rule. Actually,
of course, it could make absolutely no difference in the outcome of
the case. As the court said:
In response to the position of counsel of [B], that inasmuch as the
devise was to the same person, who would have taken the estate
as heir at law, the devise shall be held inoperative, and the
devisee as in by descent, it is to be remembered that, although it
might be so held, the result would be precisely the same .... 59
The court is referring to the fact that the grandmother was the last
family purchaser; the method by which A took the property would
be therefore immaterial.
But then the court remarks by way of dictum:
In that case [if A is in by descent], however, the result would have
been very different, as to future descents from those who, in either
case [whether A is in by descent or purchase], would inherit from
[A] and die without issue; because, only such of the heirs of such
intestate inheriting from [A] and dying without issue, could be
called to the inheritance, as were the blood of [A's] grandmother
... ; whereas, under the actual state of the case, [A], having
taken an ancestral estate by devise from his grandmother, is in by
purchase, and thereby becomes himself a stock of descent...60
The result suggested by this dictum is anomalous. Assuming
that the first purchaser idea is not directly incompatible with our
statutes of descent, it is still inconceivable that the legislature in-
tended the result suggested here. Arguably, the statute intends
that land received by descent, gift or devise from a relative be
trated in exactly the same manner. How then could a devise from
a relative in any manner change the course of descent which would
have been followed if A were in by descent? The legislative in-
tent was to treat both situations without disparity.
The two alternatives to the court's dictum are simple. The
court could abandon the first purchaser approach and declare that
67 15 Ark. 682 (1855).
58 West v. Williams, 15 Ark. 682, 687 (1855).
59 Id. at 693.
60 Id.
only blood relationship to the immediate ancestor is necessary! 1
The other alternative is to hold that chains of inheritance, gift
and devise must be followed (without allowing taking by purchase
to break the course) until the first family holder is found. That
person would then be the stock of descent. The second alternative
is an extension of the first purchaser rule as it existed at common
law, and seems contrary to the general tendency of the statute to
abrogate the rigid common-law blood requirements!112  The first
alternative seems the more acceptable one; it is not, however, the
one here chosen. Unfortunately, the case accepts neither of them;
an acceptance of either would have rendered the will branch in-
significant in problems of descent.
Irrespective of whether the court's reasoning is faulty, the
words used are indicative of how it viewed A's taking: "[U]nder
the actual state of the case, [A] having taken . . . by devise ...
is in by purchase . .".",3 This language indicates that the court
has rejected the doctrine entirely and has not merely, as in its
first pronouncement, found it without legal significance. It would
perhaps be placing too much weight on too frail a reed to regard
the West case as having irrevocably expunged the doctrine from the
law of Arkansas. But it is certain that the case does not accept
the wills branch as part of our law.
6 4
Only one other Arkansas case has been found which contains a
reference to the wills branch, and then only in the reporter's
synopsis of counsel's argument. In Shirey v. Clark6 5 the argument
was made that "an estate as by purchase passed, and not one by
descent."66 But the case involves a deed, not a will, and belongs
more properly to the inter vivos branch of the doctrine. Accord-
ingly, it will be discussed infra.6 7
D. Summary
The wills branch of the doctrine of worthier title has stub-
bornly survived its feudal origins, and, within the admittedly lim-
61 Interestingly, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma, construing the Ar-
kansas statutes of descent, arrived at this conclusion. In Lincoln v. Hem-
don, 285 P. 120 (Okla. 1930) that court overruled In re Lewis' estate, 100
Okla. 283, 229 P. 483 (1924), a first purchaser case: "Manifestly, there was
no authority for tracing the ancestral [property] further than the source of
the immediate ancestor." Lincoln v. Herndon, supra at 125. The act creat-
ing the Oklahoma Territory received into the laws of the Indian Territory
certain laws of the state of Arkansas. 1890 Stat. ch. 182, p. 81-100 (§ 31 at
98). Thus, Oklahoma courts have been called upon to construe Arkansas
statutes.
62 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-112 (1947), partially abrogating the
common-law rule which excluded half-bloods from inheritance.
63 West v. Williams, 15 Ark. 682, 693 (1855).
64 Two text writers have cited this case as having approved the wills
branch. See PAGE, WILLS § 214 (3d ed. 1941); THOMPSON, Wxi.Ls § 74 (2d
ed. 1936).
65 72 Ark. 539, 81 S.W. 1057 (1904).
66 Id. at 542.
67 See text accompanying note 115 infra. For an example of a will
directing the estate to be distributed "to my heirs," see Crittenden v. Lytle,
221 Ark. 302, 253 S.W.2d 361 (1952).
ited reach of its perimeters, unfoiuaitely persists in some few
jurisdictions. In problems of descent, lapse, and abatement the doc-
trine has sometimes been significant. In Arkansas, there is some
tenuous justification for regarding the rule as repudiated. But the
issue has never been squarely decided, and the question of its
existence remains open.
II. THE INTER Vivos BRANCH OF THE DOCTRINE OF WORTHIER TITLE
Professor Warren, in criticizing the application of the name
"doctrine of worthier title" to the inter vivos branch, once asked:
"Why tie a bull pup to the tail of a dead cat?" 68 While the wills
branch is perhaps more significant than a dead cat, it is entirely
correct to view the inter vivos branch as the "bull pup" of the two
rules. It has been involved in more litigation than its counterpart,
and has produced, at times, even more unfortunate results.
The inter vivos branch of the rule may be stated as follows:
When a conveyance is made which contains a limitation over to the
heirs of next of kin of the grantor, the limitation is ineffective, and
the grantor retains a revisionary interest.
Unlike the wills branch, this rule does not apply unless generic
terms like "heirs" or "next of kin" are used. Even if a specifically-
named remainderman turns out to be heir in fact, the rule will not
operate.6 9
A. Origins of the Inter Vivos Branch
Like its counterpart, the inter vivos branch finds its histor-
ical justification in the tenurial relationship between lord and
tenant.7 0 It seems curious, however, that the rule is limited in
its application to those instances where words like "heirs" or "next
of kin" are employed. If the true purpose of the rule was to defeat
conveyances to those who would take by intestate succession, its
limited applicability renders it singularly unsuited for accom-
plishing that object.7 ' The feudal rights of the lord could easily
be frustrated by limiting the estate eo nomine to the person who
would inherit.72 It would seem, therefore, that the rule might
have originated as a rule of construction rather than a rule of prop-
erty. No English case, however, takes this view, and a "limitation
to [the grantor's] right heirs is "meerly void. 78
68 Warren, A Remainder to the Grantor's Heirs, 22 TEXAS L. REV. 22,
28 (1943).69 SniEs AND Smrm, FuTruE INTERESTS § 1606 (2d ed. 1956).
70 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 261 (1966).
71 Professor Moynihan suggests that the rule prohibiting remainders
to heirs was simply a "natural corollary" to a thirteenth century statute
making illegal a conveyance by a tenant to his heir apparent. MOYNIHAN,
REAL PROPERTY 152 (1962).
72 Of course, in the event that the heirs were not totally ascertainable
the rule could be avoided (if at all) only with difficulty.
73 Fennick and Mitford's Case, 1 Leon. 182, 74 Eng. Rep. 168 (K.B.
1589).
B. Legal Significance of the Inter Vivos Branch
The inter vivos branch may operate to determine not how
a person will take, as is the case with the wills branch, but if
he will take at all. Consider the following example. A deeds
property to B for life, remainder to A's heirs. Subsequently, A
conveys the same property to C. Assuming that B has complied
with the formal requirements of the recording statutes, under
normal circumstances C would take nothing.74 Not so in this in-
stance according to the doctrine of worthier title. The remainder to
A's heirs is not effective, and A has retained a reversion. The
subsequent deed to C, therefore, conveyed this reversion, and upon
the termination of B's life estate, C will take possession as an owner
in fee simple. In this situation the "old argument advanced by the
English courts that the heirs must take by descent and not by
purchase has a very hollow sound. ' '75
The doctrine may have some interesting effects when consid-
ered in conjunction with the federal estate tax law. If, for instance,
using the example above, A had died holding his reversion, that
interest would be taxable to his estate under the general provisions
of section 2033.76 More importantly, if this reversion is worth
more than 5% of the property transferred, section 2037 causes the
entire interest, not just the reversion, to be included in the taxable
estate.77 By inadvertently and unknowingly retaining an interest
in his property, a grantor can thus cause the entire value of that
property to be subjected to tax liability.78
As a rule of law, the inter vivos branch has virtually nothing
to recommend it.79  Commentators have universally denounced
it as an intent-defeating trap which had relevance, if ever, only to
an economic system alien to the American system of govern-
ment.80 Dissatisfaction with the rule's arbitrary character has led
to judicial modification.
C. A Rule of Construction
In the famous case of Doctor v. Hughes,8 1 Mr. Justice (then
Judge) Cardozo injected into American law the version of the doc-
74 Actually, even if the heirs are in by purchase, A has retained a di-
vestible reversion because the remainder is contingent. C would there-
fore take this interest under the second deed.
75 Morris, The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 2
OKLA. L. REV. 133, 161 (1949).
76 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2033.
77 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2037.
78 See Beach v. Busey, 156 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 329
U.S. 802 (1947). For a discussion and analysis of this case, and other tax
consequences of the rule, see Johanson, Reversions, Remainders, and the
Doctrine of Worthier Title, 45 TEx. L. REV. 1, 16 (1960).
79 However, since reversionary interests are not subject to the Rule
against Perpetuities, an application of the inter vivos branch might save a
limitation to the heirs of the grantor. Cf. Fletcher v. Ferrill, 216 Ark. 582,
227 S.W.2d 448 (1950). Assuming an avoidance of the Rule against Per-
petuities is a desirable result, the rule has a salutary effect in this instance.
80 See, e.g., LEACH, PROPERTY LAW INDIcTED 54 (1967).
81 225 N.Y. 305, 122 N.E. 222 (1919).
trine which is approved by many courts today. The court was
called upon to construe a trust instrument. The settlor had
placed certain real property in trust, reserving to himself the in-
come therefrom for life, and upon his death the trustee was di-
rected to deliver the corpus "to the heirs at law" of the settlor.
After an extensive discussion of the rule, the court concluded that
"the rule persists today . . . as a rule of construction. '"8 2  Judge
Cardozo explained:
[T]he ancient rule survives to this extent, that to transform into a
remainder what would ordinarily be a reversion, the intention to
work the transformation must be clearly expressed.8 3
The case created a presumption that a remainder to the heirs of a
grantor is a reversion, unless a "clearly expressed" intent to the
contrary is discovered. Judge Cardozo claimed that this effectu-
ated the intent of the transferor: "[SIeldom do the living mean
to forego the power of disposition during life by the direction that
upon death there shall be a transfer to their heirs.
8 4
Many courts have since followed the rebuttable-presumption
approach proposed by Doctor v. Hughes.85 The case no doubt
represents a vast improvement over the common-law rule. It rec-
ognizes that heirs can, in some instances at least, take as pur-
chasers. The Doctor rule has, however, proved difficult to apply.s6
Just exactly how much evidence of what nature is required to
rebut the rule's conclusion has been the subject of much debate
and discussion in the cases.87 Thus dissatisfaction with the judi-
cial doctrine, both as a rule of construction and a rule of law, has
led to legislative action.
C. Statutory Abolition
Most commentators claim that the doctrine of worthier title
was abolished in England in 1833.1" The first statute which
82 Id. at 311, 122 N.E. at 222.
83 Id. at 312, 122 N.E. at 222.
84 Id. at 312, 122 N.E. at 223.
85 As a rule of property, the doctrine has virtually been abndoned.
The rule "is now only a rule of construction, not a positive rule of law."
1 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 440 (1952).
86 See generally Verral, The Doctrine of Worthier Title: A Question-
able Rule of Construction, 6 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 371 (1959).
87 One writer has concluded, after reviewing the New York cases, that
there is one method of analysis which can be employed fairly reliably to
predict the outcome of each case:
This writer's analysis confirms that a pattern is unmistakably
present .... The . . . box score for fifty-seven reported decisions
is:
Odd years: reversions 15, remainders 15
Even years: reversions 19, remainders 8
To be on the safe side, attorneys representing the remaindermen(in New York, at least) would be well advised to plan their ap-
peals so as to avoid those even years.
Johanson, supra note 78, at 11, n.38.
88 See, e.g., SIMES & SMITH, FuTuRE INTERESTS § 1612 (1956) citing 3
& 4 Will. IV, C. 106, § 3 (1833). The statute clearly abolished the testa-
mentary branch of the rule. However, the portion relevant to inter vivos
clearly abolished the doctrine was enacted in Minnesota-more
than one hundred years later.8 9  Five other states have since
abolished the doctrine; 90 most abandoned the rule both as a rule
of law and a rule of construction 1 Four of these five states
have enacted their statutes within the last decadeY2 There is
thus a kind of minor legislative revolution here.
The most significant development is the abandonment of the
doctrine as a rule of construction in New York. Last year, the
New York legislature enacted the following statute:
Where a remainder is limited to the heirs or distributees of the
creator of an estate in property, such heirs or distributees take as
purchasers. 93
Doctor v. Hughes is therefore no longer the law even in New York.
The decision was based on an assumption the validity of which was
not directly demonstrable at the time. Later cases did not succeed
in lending much credence to its correctness. 9 4
Even conceding the underlying validity of the assumption
made in Doctor, legislative action was desirable. Despite the ear-
nest efforts of the New York courts to formulate a rule which
would produce predictable results, no such formulation was forth-
coming. The statute can be fairly characterized as the result of
legislative dissatisfaction with the rule's uncertain operation. 5
transfers provides:
When any Land shall have been limited, by any Assurance exe-
cuted [after the effective date of the act] to the Person or to the
heirs of the Person who shall thereby have conveyed the same
Land, such Person shall be considered to have acquired the same
by virtue of such Assurance.
Note that the statute does not by its terms allow a grantor's heirs th
take as purchasers. The act was probably aimed at modifying the effects
of the first purchaser rule, not the inter vivos doctrine of worthier title.
There is dictum supporting this interpretation in Strickland v. Strickland,
10 Sim. 374, 59 Eng. Rep. 659 (Ch. 1839):
Consequently, if a person seized of land by descent . . . were to
execute a conveyance limiting property to himself and his heirs,:
he would be considered thenceforth as taking the land by pur-
chase, and the course of descent would be altered.
Id. at 375, 59 Eng. Rep. at 660. See also 27 HALsBURY, LAWS OF ENGLAND
723 (Hailsham ed. 1937).
89 MINN. STAT. § 500.14 (4) (1947).
90 CAL. CIV. CODE § 1073 (Supp. 1966), noted in 47 CALIF. L. REV. 74
(1959); ILL. ANN. STAT. Ch. 30, § 188 (Supp. 1965); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76.115(1958); N.Y. EST. POWERS & Tn. L. § 6-5.9 (1966); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
Art. 1291a (Supp. 1966), noted in 16 BAYLOR L. REV. 429. (1964). A Kansas
statute abolishes the wills branch only. KAN. GN . STAT. ANN. § 58-506(1949).91 The wording of the Texas statute lends itself to a construction
which would allow a court to apply the rule-of-construction approach. See
Johanson, supra note 78, at 5.92 New York (1966); Texas (1964); California (1959); Illinois (1955).
93 N. Y. EST. POWEaS & TR. L. § 6-5.9 (1966).
94 In reviewing the later New York cases, it has been concluded that
"the Cardozo statement that the rule finds support in the assumed inten-
tion of the grantor is repeated without analysis or enthusiasm." Verral,
The Doctrine of Worthier Title: A Questionable Rule of Construction, 6
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 371, 388.
95 See NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMM'N REPORT 111 (1951).
Rules of property, however, are abrogated only with difficulty.
The New York statute, while it appears to have covered the previ-
ous New York cases quite adequately, may have only partially
repealed the rule. The statute applies exclusively in cases where
the limitation in question is a remainder. It is true that in most
cases the rule operates to transform a remainder into a reversion.
However, the rule is not concerned solely with remainders; it
applies to any kind of limitation to heirs of the grantor. Thus
the doctrine can also transform an executory interest into a pos-
sibility of reverter 6 Presumably, the New York statute would
not apply in this situation. This omission by the New York legisla-
ture, one suspects, was inadvertent. No more valid reasons for the
rule exist when an executory limitation is created than when a
remainder is involvedY7
D. The Arkansas Cases
The text writers and commentators uniformly include Arkansas
among the handful of jurisdictions which still cling to the doctrine
as a rule of property.9 8 The case universally cited for this proposi-
tion is Wilson v. Pharris9
In Wilson, the court had before it a deed which, after a grant
of a life estate to the grantor's daughter, contained the following
proviso: "[B]ut should said [grantee] marry, or at her death, the
... land to revert to the said grantor's heirs."100  The grantor
subsequently reconveyed the same property to her daughter in fee
simple, and died intestate. During the daughter's lifetime, an ac-
tion to quiet title was instituted. She claimed fee simple title
under the second deed. The other heirs of the grantor claimed as
tenants in common with the daughter as remaindermen under the
first deed*1 1  The trial court ruled that the first deed created
a contingent remainder in the grantor's heirs, and the second deed
was thus ineffective. 10 2
The Arkansas Supreme Court, relying on cases from Illinois
and Kentucky, reversed the lower court. They found instead that
the first deed created a reversion in the grantor. The result seems
sound; the grantor's use of the word "revert" seems good evi-
dence of an intention to retain a reversion rather than to create a
96 See, e.g., Coomes v. Frey, 141 Ky. 740, 133 S.W. 758 (1911); In re
Brolasky's Estate, 302 Pa. 439, 153 A. 739 (1931). But see 27 HALSEURY,
LAWS OF ENGLAND 723 n. (r) (Hailsham ed. 1937).
97 None of the other statutes listed in note 90 supra contains this defect.
98 See 3 POWELL, REAL PROPERTY 264 (1966); 1 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY 441 (1952); SIMES & SMITH, FuTuRE INTERESTS § 1605 (1956);
Morris, supra note 75, at 143.
99 203 Ark. 614, 158 S.W.2d 274 (1941).
100 Id. at 615, 158 S.W.2d at 275.
101 The grantor had died and therefore the remainder had vested;
there was no difficulty in ascertaining the identity of the remaindermen.
102 Even if the heirs took as purchasers, an application of the destruct-
ibility rule would destroy their interest. The daughter took a life estate
under the first deed and a divestible reversion under the second; the two
would merge to defeat the heirs' contingent remainder. The court appar-
ently did not consider this possibility. See generally Fetters, The Destruct-
ibility of Contingent Remainders, 21 ARx. L. REV. 145 (1967).
remainder in her heirs. 03 However, the court's rationale was un-
fortunate. Wilson came dangerously close to injecting into Ar-
kansas law the doctrine of worthier title as a rule of positive law.
The court quoted with apparent approval from Washburn on
Real Property:
At common law, if a man seized of an estate limited it to one for
life, remainder to his own right heirs, they would not take as re-
maindermen but as reversioners; and it would be, moreover, com-
petent for him, as being himself a reversioner, after making such
a limitation, to grant away the reversion. 104
No doubt the above quotation furnishes the basis upon which the
text writers have classified the rule as one of law in Arkansas.
However, it is arguable that the common-law rule was not
applied here. First, the court cited Alexander v. DeKernal'0 5
as authority for its holding. That case unequivocally rejects the
rule-of-law approach:
[I]t is undoubtedly the law that Thomas Bullitt Alexander had the
right to designate his heirs as purchasers, but whether he in-
tended to do so depends upon the terms which he employed. We
must assume, in the absence of words in deed expressing a con-
trary intention, that the language quoted from was used in its
legal sense, and subject to legal interpretation. 06
Alexander did not even accept the Doctor rationale.107 The case
plainly turns on the use of the word "revert" in the deed. The
court here relied on ordinary rules of construction to reach its
result.
Second, the other case relied on, Akers v. Clark,08 although it
contained language indicating a rule-of-laW approach, recognized
that the result would have been the same even if an arbitrary rule
of law were not applied:
Without, however, rejecting any word in the conveyance, by the
terms of the -deed the heirs would take as reversioners, and not
as remaindermen.109
Additionally, at least one commentator claims the Akers case ap-
plied'the rule as one of construction. 110 Again, as in Alexan-
103 "Some courts have found a clear intention to retain a reversion
where the instrument provides that after the death of the life tenant the
property shall 'revert' to the heirs or next of kin of the grantor." Morris,
The Inter Vivos Branch of the Worthier Title Doctrine, 2 OKL. L. Rsv. 133,
155 (1949).
104 WASHBURN, REAL PROPERTY 395 (1887), quoted in Wilson v. Pharris,
203 Ark. 614, 617, 158 S.W.2d 274, 276 (1941). The court also quotes from
23 R.C.L. 1100 (1919); the quotation is Virtually identical to the one from
WASHBURN.
105 81 Ky. 345 (1883).
106 Id. at 349.
107 The case of course antedates Doctor v. Hughes by 36 years.
108 184 Ill. 136, 56 N.E. 296 (1900).
109 56 N.E. 297 (1900).
110 A note in 40 ILL. L. REv. 404 (1940) criticizes Corwin v. Rheims,
390 Ill. 205, 61 N.E.2d 40 (1945) for rigidly applying the rule, and Says that
the Illinois cases had previously recognized the rule as one of construction.
der, this case certainly did not adopt the rebuttable-presumption
approach of Doctor. If the rule as one of law was in fact re-
jected, then ordinary rules were resorted to in an effort to deter-
mine the grantor's intent.
Third, the language which the Arkansas court employed in
characterizing its task gives further credence to the proposition
that the rule applied was not one of law. The court said: 'The
decision of this case turns, of course, upon the construction of the
deeds . . ."I" Clearly, if it were legally impossible to create a
remainder in the heirs of the grantor, the court would have little
occasion to construe the deed.112
A later Arkansas case, Fletcher v. Ferrill,113 virtually ex-
plodes any thesis that the rule exists in its common-law form
in Arkansas. The court had before it a deed executed to a masonic
lodge. After reserving a life estate, the grantor J. W. Fletcher
provided that the property be used exclusively for the benefit of
a specified orphans' home and school, with a further proviso that:
When it ceases to be so used, or when said home and school shall
be moved from Batesville, Ark., said property shall revert to the
heirs of J. W. Fletcher.114
The court assessed the difficulty which the deed presented
as follows:
The principal question is whether the language of the deed, "said
property shall revert to the heirs of the said J. W. Fletcher," cre-
ated (a) a possibility of reverter in Fletcher himself or (b) an
executory limitation to Fletcher's heirs .... 115
The language above is, of course, completely inconsistent with a
rule of property which refuses to admit the possibility that a
grantor's heirs can take as purchasers. The court further states
that "the inquiry really narrows down to whether the word 'heirs'
is here a word of limitation or one of purchase;""l 6 it was simply
conceded that the heirs of a grantor can take as purchasers.
The deed was construed to create a possibility of reverter
rather than an executory interest. But in deciding the case the
court did not woodenly refuse to recognize heirs as purchasers.
It arrived at its conclusion by employing the ordinary methods of
construction.
Id. at 411. Akers is cited in support of that thesis. The nature of the rule
in Illinois, prior to its abolition in 1955, was uncertain. SIMES & SMITH,
FUTURE INTERESTS § 1609 (2d ed. 1956).
111 Wilson v. Pharris, 203 Ark. 614, 616, 158 S.W.2d 274, 275 (1941).
112 Admittedly, even in those jurisdictions where the rule is one of
law, there are certain preliminary questions of construction which must be
answered before the rule is applied. See, e.g., text accompanying note 116
infra. But the court did not indicate that it viewed its construction task as
only preliminary.
113 216 Ark. 583, 227 S.W.2d 449 (1950).
114 Id. at 584, 227 S.W.2d at 449.
115 Id.
116 Id. at 585, 227 S.W.2d at 450.
The Fletcher opinion makes absolutely no mention of the doc-
trine of worthier title-either as a rule of law or a rule of con-
struction. It is therefore arguable that the case can serve no
basis for the thesis that the common-law rule is not a part of
Arkansas law. Perhaps the court was simply oblivious to the doc-
trine. A real rejection naturally requires cognizance of the rule
rejected. It is certain, however, that the case does not recognize
the rule as part of Arkansas law. Furthermore, the court cites
Wilson as authority for its holdings. It must have regarded that
case as in accord with the principle that the grantor's intention
shall govern in deed cases. The court is, after all, the final inter-
preter of its own prior decisions. Therefore, the proposition that
the inter vivos branch exists in its common-law form in Arkansas
is seriously questionable.
One other Arkansas case seems apposite. In Shirey v. Clerk,117
the grantor A. W. Clark conveyed the property to his wife Emily
for life, and after her death "then to the heirs of the said A. W.
Clark by the said Emily Clark. 11 8 Emily died, and A. W. Clark
subsequently conveyed the same land to A. W. Shirey. The court
ruled the second conveyance ineffective.
According to the court, Shirey's counsel argued that "a deed to
the heirs of a living person is always held void;" 119 the court
responded that this statement of the law might be correct. Per-
haps as to present interests this proposition is correct. 120  As to
future interests there is of course no such rule. The general rule
is that a remainder to the heirs of a living person is, during the
lifetime of that person, contingent. If that person dies before the
termination of the supporting estate, the remainder vests in right.
If the supporting estate falls in before that person dies, applying
the destructibility rule, the remainder fails for want of persons to
take. The divestible reversion retained by the grantor ripens into
a fee but the remainder interest is not void; it is simply not vested
and may fail. In addition to this general rule, there exist two
specific exceptions which do void remainders created in the heirs
of a living person. One is the rule in Shelley's case which plainly
has no application here.12 1 The other is the doctrine of worthier
title.
117 72 Ark. 539, 81 S.W. 1057 (1904).
11s Id. at 540, 81 S.W. at 1057.
119 Id. at 543, 81 S.W. at 1058.
120 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 12.40 (1952); DEVLIN, DEEDS § 184
(1887). However, it is difficult to see why the property should not result
to the grantor subject to an executory interest in favor of the heirs when
they become -ascertainable.
121 The difference between the Rule in Shelley's Case and the doctrine
of worthier title is not always appreciated by the courts. The most fre-
quently cited example of this confusion is Sutliff v. Aydelott, 373 Ill. 633,
27 N.E.2d 523 (1943), noted in 35 ILL. L. REV. 590 (1941). For a thorough
examination and discussion of the differences in the scope and operation
of these two rules, see Morris, supra note 103, at 167. There is some dis-
agreement among the authorities as to whether some situations might call
for an application of both rules. Professor Simes says that some do. SIMEs
& SmITh, supra note 110, at § 1607. Professor Moynihan suggests that Pro-
However, the doctrine of worthier title operates only when the
word "heirs" is used in its technical sense. It has no application
when the word is used to denote "children." This case nicely
illustrates the point. The court concluded that the words "heirs
of the said A. W. Clark by the said Emily Clark" could have no other
meaning than "children." The doctrine would therefore have no
application. Had the doctrine been applied, the conveyance to
Shirey would have been effective.
E. Summary
The common-law inter vivos branch of the doctrine of worthier
title stated that a limitation to the grantor's heirs was void; the
grantor instead retained a reversionary interest. Many modern
courts have rejected that approach and have substituted for it a
rebuttable presumption of reversion. The modern rule is ostensibly
bottomed on a desire to accomplish the grantor's intent. Whether
its underlying assumption is valid is seriously questionable. In
any case the modern rule has proved difficult to apply, and legis-
latures are responding by abolishing it. Under these statutes, heirs
take as purchasers.
The nature of the Arkansas rule is uncertain. One case con-
tained language indicative of a rule-of-law approach. A later case,
relying on the first case as authority, is plainly inconsistent with
the common-law rule. In any event, the rebuttable-presumption
rule is clearly not a part of Arkansas law.
III. CONCLUSION
Arkansas law has not been bothered much by either branch
of the doctrine of worthier title. The wills branch has been
virtually ignored. The inter vivos branch, though its status is un-
certain, has probably never affected the result of any decision. The
only case which seems to recognize its existence would have
reached the same conclusion, whether the rule applied was one of
law or one of construction. In fact, the outcome of that case
would probably stand even had the inter vivos rule, in both its
forms, been abolished by statute.
This fortunate state of affairs cannot, in light of other states'
experiences with the doctrine, be expected to continue for long.
Since a judicial rejection of the rule would hardly unsettle many
estates planned in reliance on it, the Arkansas court might see fit,
if the issue were raised directly, to repudiate it. In the meantime,
however, the uncertainty which the doctrine would shed over a
portion of Arkansas's property law could well cause complications.
A title examiner would be hard pressed to give a definitive answer
to a question involving its significance.
Legislative clarification seems imperative. The wills branch
has never proved useful in any jurisdiction. It serves a purpose
fessor Simes's conclusion is not correct. MOYNIHAN, supra note 71, at 161.
The reader may take his choice.
which perhaps endeared it to a medieval mind; it can serve today
only to obfuscate. The inter vivos branch, in its common-law form,
has nothing to recommend it. As a prima facie canon of con-
struction, it has proved unworkable. New York's decision to abol-
ish it is strong evidence of its elusive nature.122
The defects in Arkansas's property law are not, however, limited
to the small area occupied by the doctrine of worthier title. Pro-
fessor Fetters has pointed this out and has cautioned that "piece-
meal reform may create more problems than it solves."'12 3 For
instance, in Wilson the same result could have been reached by
an application of the destructibility rule. Thus the salutary ef-
fects of abolishing the worthier title doctrine might, in some
cases at least, be diluted by the untimely exhumation of another
outmoded rule of property. Until a comprehensive property act is
enacted in Arkansas, Mr. Justice McFaddin's plea that "the inten-
tion of the parties should govern, rather than any hard and fast
formulae anciently established"'124 may remain largely unheeded.
MoRis S. ARNoLD
122 Professor Verrall suggests the following statute:
The rules of worthier title, both as rules of law and as rules of
construction as applied to limitations to heirs or next of kin of
conveyors or testators or to limitations having such meaning
though not employing such terms, are abolished and the meaning
of such limitations shall be determined by the general rules con-
trolling the construction of conveyances or wills.
Verrall, supra note 94, at 396. See also 9B U.L.A., PROPERTY §§ 14, 15 (1966).
123 Fetters, The Destructibility of Contingent Remainders, 21 ARK. L.
REv. (1967).
124 McFaddin, J. dissenting in Bishop v. Williams, 221 Ark. 617, 620,
255 S.W.2d 171, 173 (1953), a case involving the Rule in Shelley's Case.
See Note, 7 ARK. L. REv. 411 (1953).
